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BLAINE'S BIGOTRY: PREVENTING SCHOOL
VOUCHERS IN OKLAHOMA... TEMPORARILY
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Role of Government in Education, Milton Friedman articulated the
importance of education in a democratic setting, stating:
A stable and democratic society is impossible without widespread acceptance of
some common set of values and without a minimum degree of literacy and
knowledge on the part of most citizens. Education contributes to both. In
consequence, the gain from the education of a child accrues not only to the child or
to his parents but to other members of the society; the education of my child
contributes to other people's welfare by promoting a stable and democratic society
Therefore, it is understandable why poorly performing elementary and secondary
public schools and their effects on children in the United States have been a focus
2of concern and debate for many years. Parents constantly search for methods to
ensure that their children receive the quality education their hard-earned tax
dollars should provide.3 Very little debate exists among citizens concerning the
overall importance of education to this country; even the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged the "pivotal role" that education plays in our society.
4
Although people agree that education is crucial, they also recognize that the
current education system is failing to provide many students with an education
that ensures the children's ability to be productive members of society.' Debate
among think tanks, politicians, parents, teachers, and other groups has generated
many proposed solutions, but these proposals have received far from unanimous
support.6
1. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in Economics and the Public Interest
123, 124-25 (Robert A. Solo ed., Greenwood Press 1982).
2. See U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off. Rpt. to the Hon. Judd Gregg, School Vouchers: Publicly Funded
Programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee 1 (Aug. 2001) (available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d01914.pdf>).
3. Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The Answer to a Failing Public School System, 23 Hamline J.
Pub. L. & Policy 73, 73 (2001).
4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.").
5. See Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1281, 1283 (2002) ("[T]here is widespread,
though certainly not unanimous, agreement that 'far too many' of our nation's government schools are
failing." (footnotes omitted)).
6. See id. at 1284-85.
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Generally, a student is assigned to a certain school district corresponding to
the student's place of residence 7 without regard to the school's performance. 8 This
system allows parents very little choice as to which school their child attends.
Almost fifty years ago, Friedman, an economist, saw the inherent flaws in this
system of education and proposed absolute school choice for the nation's parents.9
Friedman's concept of school choice, which would allow parents the freedom to
choose which and what type of school 0 their children attend, has moved to the
forefront of the current education debate.1 Accompanying the parents' choice of
school are funds to help offset any increased expense that may accrue in attending
the different school 2  The most controversial of the school choice proposals,
school vouchers, allow parents to apply tax proceeds to educational purposes.13
School vouchers are simply programs that provide payment in the name of
students for parents to apply to the tuition of a school they choose." These
vouchers provide to a child, regardless of socioeconomic background, the
opportunity to receive the quality education that had been previously available
only to the wealthy. 5
Enactment of voucher programs would drastically alter the modem school
system. 16 Notwithstanding the extraordinary changes that would occur following
implementation of a voucher program, the past twenty years have seen many
proposals for school choice.17 The voucher concept, controversial as it is,
continues to be the focus of much debate." This discussion over vouchers has
found its way into political campaigns across the country, reaching even the 2000
presidential campaign. 19
7. See e.g. Okla. Stat. tit. 70 § 1-113 (2001).
8. See e.g. id. § 8-103.1 (mandating that the student apply to the school board of the new school
and meet the criteria outlined in the school's transfer policy to be allowed to transfer between school
districts without residing in the district).
9. See Friedman, supra n. 1, at 123-44.
10. Parents may choose to send their children to the state-assigned public school, another public
school, a charter school, or a private school.
11. Brian P. Gill et al., Rhetoric Versus Reality: What We Know and What We Need to Know About
Vouchers and Charter Schools 1 (Rand 2001).
12. Jo Ann Bodemer, Student Author, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional
Lemon-Aid from the Lemon Test, 70 St. John's L. Rev. 273, 280 (1996).
13. Garnett, supra n. 5, at 1283.
14. Renee Oliver, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Vouchers <http://www.
educational-freedom.org/whychoice.htm> (accessed Sept. 22, 2003).
15. Garnett, supra n. 5, at 1282 ("[Fjamilies of means can make choices about education. They
move to neighborhoods with good schools. They can send their kids to private or parochial schools.
Poor parents have no such choices. If their local schools are failing, their kids are trapped." (quoting
Geneva Overholser, Coming Around on Vouchers, Wash. Post A15 (Sept. 20, 1999) (internal
quotations omitted)).
16. See id. at 1303 ("[Slhifting educational authority from government to parents is a policy that
rests upon basic beliefs about the dignity of the person, the rights of children, and the sanctity of the
family; it is a shift that also promises a harvest of social trust as the experience of responsibility is
extended to all." (quoting John E. Coons, School Choice and Simple Justice, First Things 15, 15 (Apr.
1992) (footnote and internal quotations omitted)).
17. See infra § II (discussing the various proposals and current programs in operation).
18. See Hansen, supra n. 3, at 74.
19. President George W. Bush is a voucher supporter, while former Vice President Al Gore
opposes them. Id. at 74-75.
[Vol. 39:207
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The voucher debate has also hit close to home in Oklahoma, where the
public has focused on the school system.20  Because of concern for the state
schools, former Governor Frank Keating and former Congressman J.C. Watts, Jr.,
supported voucher programs. 21  Furthermore, the media frequently questioned
candidates about their opinion on the implementation of school voucher programs
during the gubernatorial election of 2002.22 This kept education a central issue on
everyone's mind. And, like the rest of the nation, candidates stood on both sides
of the issue.23
Making history in 1990, the Wisconsin state legislature enacted the first
school voucher program in the United States, aimed specifically at Milwaukee
public schools.24 Originally, this program allowed choice only among other public
schools and non-religious private schools in Milwaukee.25 Wisconsin later
amended the program by removing the nonsectarian requirement for private
schools; as a result, the students were permitted to use vouchers to attend religious
schools.26
Since 1990, other states have chosen to adopt systems of school vouchers.27
Currently, three states-Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida-have publicly-funded
voucher programs. 28  And in 2000, "at least 21 states... proposed voucher
legislation. "2 9 With the increase in number of programs, voucher opponents have
taken their complaints to the courts, arguing that these programs violate the
United States Constitution.30 The United States Supreme Court rejected this
argument in the summer of 2002, ruling that the voucher program enacted in
20. See e.g. Okla. Educ. Assn., Save Our Schools <http://www.okea.org/SOS/index.htm> (accessed
Oct. 8, 2003).
21. Catharine V. Ewing, Student Author, Constitutional Law: Vouchers, Sectarian Schools, and
Constitutional Uncertainty: Choices for the United States Supreme Court and the States, 53 Okla. L. Rev.
437, 438 (2000).
22. See Nine Seeking Governor's Seat: Voters to Pick Party Nominees in Aug. 27 Primaries, Tulsa
World All, All (Aug. 12, 2002) (available in 2002 WL 7129484) (asking of each candidate, "Should
the state adopt a school voucher law?").
23. See id.
24. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 80.
25. See id. at 80-81.
26. Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(b) (2001-2002) ("[A]ny pupil... may attend.., any private school located
in the city" if the school complies with the terms of the statute, namely: registers with the
superintendent of schools, meets health and safety codes, and is non-discriminatory as defined in the
United States Code); see Hansen, supra n. 3, at 81.
27. See U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off. Rpt. to the Hon. Judd Gregg, School Vouchers: Publicly Funded
Programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee 1 (Aug. 2001) (available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d01914.pdf>).
28. Id.
29. Natl. Conf. of St. Legis., School Vouchers <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/voucher.htm>
(accessed Sept. 22, 2003).
30. See e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602
(Wis. 1998); Bush v. Holmes, 767 S.2d 668 (Fla. Dist. App. 2000); Holmes v. Bush, 2002 WL 1809079
(Fla. Cir. Aug. 5, 2002).
2003]
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Cleveland, Ohio did not violate the Establishment Clause31 of the U.S.
32Constitution.
After the Court's landmark decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
Oklahoma state legislators now have the framework to design federally
permissible school voucher programs. The voucher program in Florida, however,
illustrates that voucher opponents may take another route to bar the programs
within the states.33  Like Florida, thirty-six states, including Oklahoma, have
Blaine Amendments-state constitutional clauses that are much stricter than the
U.S. Constitution concerning funds that may reach sectarian institutions.34 Many
state constitutions completely bar any public funding of religious institutions.35 In
fact, the Oklahoma constitutional language, which is viewed as very strict, 36 will
defeat any attempt to implement a school voucher program.3 7
As history reveals, the Blaine Amendments were the product of bigotry and
anti-catholic sentiment present in this country during the late 1800'S.38  A
considerable amount of debate concerning the merits of these amendments still
exists today.39 Barry Lynn, Executive Director of Americans for Separation of
Church and State, acknowledges the bigotry present in the Amendment's
enactment; however, he is quick to point out that "[tihe effect of these
amendments has been positive for all religions, including the Catholic Church, and
we have no discomfort using them., 40  Much to the dismay of the Blaine
Amendment supporters, the continued vitality of the amendments with respect to
school vouchers should be only temporary, as the United States Constitution will
work to overrule the bigoted language in state constitutions.41 Shortly after the
Zelman decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, on free exercise
grounds, that the Blaine Amendment in Washington could not prevent a
scholarship recipient from studying theology.42 Last Term, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari43 to this case and oral arguments will be heard
in December 2003.4
31. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ).
32. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63.
33. See Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079 at *1.
34. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments, States
<http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html> (accessed Oct. 2, 2003).
35. See Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 Educ. L. Rptr. 1, 5-7
(1997).
36. See Ewing, supra n. 21, at 437.
37. See id.; Kemerer, supra n. 35, at 5.
38. See Tony Mauro, The 'Blaine' Game: Voucher War Heads to States that Ban Funding of
Religious Schools, 25 Leg. Times 1, 1 (Aug. 5, 2002).
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41. See infra § IV (discussing the Blaine Amendments and their enactment).
42. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
43. Locke v. Davey, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003).
44. S. Ct., Oral Arguments, Argument Calendars, Session Beginning December 1, 2003 <http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-calendars/monthlyargumentcaldecember2003.pdf>
(last updat-ed Nov. 3, 2003).
[Vol. 39:207
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Studying the relative uncertainty of school vouchers in the United States,
this comment will focus on the likelihood of voucher success in Oklahoma. 5
Section II of this comment explores the turbulent history of school vouchers,
including current programs, to provide a background on school vouchers. Then,
the comment shifts in Section III to the constitutionality of vouchers under the
Establishment Clause as outlined in Supreme Court precedent and specifically the
Zelman decision. Section IV examines the history and enactment of Blaine
Amendments in the United States and Oklahoma. Section V of the comment
!ooks at the likelihood of removing the last constitutional hurdle for school
voucher implementation in Oklahoma, including the merits and arguments for and
against overturning the Blaine Amendments by the U.S. Supreme Court.
II. HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS
A. Early History
Scholars have written about providing choice in educational settings for
centuries.46 In 1776, Adam Smith wrote that children should be allowed to choose
their own teachers, as this would advance the teachers' skills.47 In The Rights of
Man, Thomas Paine proposed granting tax funds to low-income families so they
could choose which schools their children would attend.48 Then, nearly fifty years
ago, a Nobel laureate in economics, Milton Friedman, supported absolute school
choice for parents, a plan whereby the government played little to no role in
education. 9
In what may have been the first widely used voucher program, the federal
government enacted the G.I. Bill5° as veterans were returning from World War
11.51 This legislation allowed military veterans to obtain money to pay tuition at
the university of their choice.52 Veterans were allowed to choose any university
45. Because of Oklahoma's very strict interpretation of its Blaine Amendment, any action taken
that successfully subverts the effects of the amendment could be used by the other states to achieve
identical results.
46. See Eric Nasstrom, Student Author, School Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting the Walls
Separating Church and State, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1065, 1070 (1996).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Friedman, supra n. 1, at 123-44 (noting that the government could play a minimal role in the
education of children by giving parents vouchers that could be used at participating schools of their
choosing and could use any extra proceeds to spend on other educationally related materials);
Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1070-71; Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Supreme Court and
Vouchers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 160 Educ. L. Rep. 279, 279-80 (2002).
50. See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944). The Bill has
been amended numerous times over the past sixty years. In 1984, Congress enacted the "All Volunteer
Force Educational Assistance Program" of the "Montgomery GI Bill Program." In this program, the
recipient of the aid must accept a pay reduction while in active duty. Later, in 1987, the United States
Congress made the program permanent. See University of Central Florida Office of Veteran's Affairs,
History of the GI Bill <http://www.va.ucf.edu/new-page-l.htm> (accessed Oct. 2, 2003).
51. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 304.
52. See 58 Stat. at 288 ("[Qualifying veterans] shall be eligible for and entitled to such course of
education or training as he may elect, and at any approved educational or training institution at which
he chooses to enroll .... ); id. at 290 ("As used in this part, the term 'educational or training institutions'
2003]
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that complied with the provisions of the statute, even religious private schools. 53
Interestingly, the G.I. Bill has never been challenged in the courts to determine its
permissibility under the Constitution, despite its nearly identical nature to school
vouchers.54
Republican presidents over the past twenty years have attempted to
capitalize on the success of the G.I. Bill by enacting similar programs for
children.55 President Reagan urged Congress to enact voucher programs in 1983,
1985, and 1986 with no success.56 In 1991, former President Bush proposed the
"GI Bill for Children," which was also unsuccessful.57  Popular belief is that the
lobbying of special interest groups, particularly the National Education
Association, 51 was the impetus behind the failure of the proposals. 59 The push for
federal legislation enacting school vouchers lessened with President Bush's defeat
in the 1992 election. 60 Recently, however, President George W. Bush, in the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001,6i was successful in ensuring legislation that will
increase the likelihood for parents with children in failing schools to choose
another school.
B. Predominant Arguments
Despite the G.I. Bill's success and presidential support, there is still heated
62debate over vouchers. The arguments for and against vouchers take many forms,
ranging from the need to prevent religious indoctrination to the application of
market hypothesis theories.
63
Typically, opponents of school vouchers focus on the economic impact
vouchers will have on the public school system, the fear of state-sponsored
religious indoctrination of children, and other social concerns. 64  Economic
arguments spring from the belief that by allowing state money to be applied to
shall include all public or private elementary, secondary, and other schools furnishing education for
adults, business schools and colleges, scientific and technical institutions, colleges, vocational schools,
junior colleges, teachers colleges, normal schools, professional schools, universities, and other
educational institutions ... ").
53. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 304.
54. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 78-79.
55. Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1074-75.
56. Id. at 1074, 1074 n. 6.
57. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 305.
58. Hereafter referred to as the "NEA." The NEA is comprised of 2.7 million members working in
all levels of education throughout the country. NEA, About NEA
<http://www.nea.org/aboutnea.html> (accessed Oct. 11, 2003). The stated purpose of the organization
is "advancing the cause of public education." Id.
59. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 306 ("No group lobbied against the GI Bill; the GI Bill for Children,
however, was vehemently opposed by the NEA." (footnote omitted)).
60. Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1075.
61. See Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). This choice, though, is limited to other schools in
the district, including charter schools. See Dept. of Educ., Executive Summary of the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 <http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.pdf> (accessed Sept. 27, 2003).
62. See e.g. NEA, Vouchers <http://www.nea.org/vouchers> (accessed Oct. 11, 2003).
63. See Brian L. White, Student Author, Potential Federal and State Constitutional Barriers to the
Success of School Vouchers, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 889, 896-902 (2001).
64. See id. at 898-902.
[Vol. 39:207
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private schools, the already low operating budgets of the public schools will be
depleted even further.65 Opponents also fear that school vouchers will "coerce"
students into attending private religious schools when other options are limited.
66
The legal attacks focus on the belief that the limited nonsectarian options offered
present a clearly unconstitutional combination of church and state.67  These
arguments predict that school vouchers will likely "encourage economic, racial,
ethnic, and religious stratification ' ' 8 in the schools. If given the choice, opponents
argue, parents will choose schools with students similar to their children.
69
Proponents of vouchers, on the other hand, focus their arguments on market
theories, schools' performance ratings, and equity.7 °  The statistics available
concerning public schools' poor performance are a frequent mode of attack
utilized by voucher supporters.7 They point to the vast increases in spending over
the years which have only resulted in mediocre to poor performance in the
schools.72  Similar to how the marketplace provided for great everyday
innovations, it is argued that a voucher program would provide great advancement
in education. 3 This marketplace theory rests on the belief that voucher systems
"would create a competitive environment which would ultimately result in better
education for both the private and public school student.,7 4 Another contention
studies the greater effectiveness of private schools as compared to their public
counterparts; this is the case despite the lower operating budgets of private
schools.75 Because public schools trail their private counterparts in efficiency and
product quality, proponents argue, market forces will either require that the
school improve or dissolve.76 Finally, voucher advocates assert that requiring
students to remain in failing schools because of their place of residence is not
65. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 75.
66. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 706-07 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
67. See Kemerer, supra n. 35, at 1.
68. NEA, supra n. 58.
69. They believe this segregation will be by race, religion, and economic class, cf. id., whereas, "the
common school involves a healthy social mixing of children from all races and classes." Gill et al.,
supra n. 11, at 19.
70. See White, supra n. 63, at 896-97.
71. They argue that increased spending has failed, so it is time to try school vouchers. See Bodemer,
supra n. 12, at 275.
72. See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Why No Child Left Behind is Important to America <http://www.
nochildleftbehind.gov/next/stats/index.html> (last accessed Nov. 24, 2002) (showing the vast increases
in spending over the past decade with negative results in some cases, while others see a minor
improvement; but all of the tested achievement levels fall below the fifty percent barrier of success)
(on file with the Tulsa Law Review).
73. White, supra n. 63, at 897.
74. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 287-88. Voucher proponents argue the competition between public
and private schools that will result from the voucher programs will motivate each school to provide a
better product (education) in order to maintain their customers (students and parents). See White,
supra n. 63, at 897.
75. See White, supra n. 63, at 896.
76. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 303.
20031
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fair.77 Wealthy families are readily able to send their children to private schools,
but poorer families cannot do this, making the situation inherently unfair.78
As the arguments illustrate, the public has been divided on the issue across
the nation. With the hope that their efforts will either prevent or ensure voucher
enactment, opponents and proponents of vouchers, alike, funnel millions of
dollars each year into lobbying efforts and campaign contributions across the
country.
79
C. Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
Wisconsin's implementation of the nation's first school voucher program in
1990 was an enormous victory for voucher advocates.80 This program, titled the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP),8' allowed parents to use vouchers
at any public school or a nonsectarian private school of their choice. 82 In 1995, the
Wisconsin Legislature amended this program to give parents the choice of sending
83their children to religious private schools. According to the statute, a child living
in Milwaukee may attend any private school within the city84 as long as the school
meets certain qualifications, including academic performance85  and anti-
77. White, supra n. 63, at 896-97.
78. Id.
79. NEA, supra n. 58.
80. See Hansen, supra n. 3, at 80.
81. Wis. Stat. § 119.23.
82. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 80.
83. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608. Another change in the program at that time was the process by
which tuition money was disbursed. While the original program sent the check directly to the school
chosen by the parents, the amended program provided for the money to be sent directly to the parents
who then applied the money to the school of their choosing. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 81.
84. The applicable statute states:
(2)(a) Subject to par. (b), any pupil in grades kindergarten to 12 who resides within the city
may attend, at no charge, any private school located in the city if all of the following apply:
1. The pupil is a member of a family that has a total family income that does not
exceed an amount equal to 1.75 times the poverty level determined in accordance with
criteria established by the director of the federal office of management and budget.
2. In the previous school year the pupil was enrolled in the school district operating
under this chapter, was attending a private school under this section, was enrolled in
grades kindergarten to 3 in a private school located in the city other than under this
section or was not enrolled in school.
3. The private school notified the state superintendent of its intent to participate in the
program under this section by February 1 of the previous school year. The notice shall
specify the number of pupils participating in the program under this section for which
the school has space.
4. The private school complies with 42 USC 2000d.
5. The private school meets all health and safety laws or codes that apply to public
schools.
Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a).
85. Id. § 119.23(7)(a). The statute states:
(7)(a) Each private school participating in the program under this section shall meet at least
one of the following standards:
1. At least 70% of the pupils in the program advance one grade level each year.
2. The private school's average attendance rate for the pupils in the program is at least
90%.
8
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discrimination standards.8 6 To prevent religious schools from imposing their
beliefs and practices upon the children without parental consent, parents have the
option of excluding their children from religious activities.87
Not surprisingly, the MPCP was met with opposition and challenged in court
on state and federal constitutionality claims.88 In 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruled that the program was acceptable under both the United States and
Wisconsin constitutions.89 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,90
and thus the MPCP is safe pending subsequent review.
D. Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program
For many years, the public schools within the Cleveland Municipal School
District had been among the worst performing in the nation. 9' This poor
performance caused the federal court in the Northern District of Ohio to declare
that the school system was in a crisis situation.92 To help alleviate the problem,
the district court granted full control of the school to the state.93 Following some
preliminary tests, the state auditor declared that "Cleveland's public schools were
in the midst of a 'crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American
education."' 94 The students in this school district were not able to compete with
students in other districts throughout the state; in fact, only ten percent of
Cleveland's ninth graders were able to pass proficiency tests.95 And with the
district's high dropout rate, only one-twelfth of those who were eligible to
96graduate actually did. Tests showed that those who did graduate from
Cleveland's schools had basic skills well below those of the students at other
schools.97
To help combat this problem, the Ohio Legislature enacted the Ohio Pilot
Project Scholarship Program in 1995.98 This program allows the students in failing
3. At least 80% of the pupils in the program demonstrate significant academic progress.
4. At least 70% of the families of pupils in the program meet parent involvement
criteria established by the private school.
Id.
86. Id. § 2(a)(4); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
87. Wis. Stat. § 119.23(7)(c).
88. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 (Wis. 1998) (holding that the amended MPCP did
not violate the Wisconsin Constitution); Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992) (finding the
original version of the MPCP valid).
89. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620.
90. Jackson v. Benson, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
91. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Cleveland City Sch. Dist. Performance Audit 2-1 (Mar. 1996)).
95. Id.
96. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
97. Id.
98. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.97-3313.979 (West 1999).
2003]
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schools99 to receive scholarship assistance to attend other schools; parents may
choose nonsectarian private, sectarian private, charter, or magnet schools, or their
children can attend public schools in adjacent districts. °° Like the MPCP, tuition
payments are in the parents' names for endorsement to the school they choose. 1
The program also allows children who remain in their assigned schools to obtain
funding for private tutoring; this provision was added as an attempt to improve
those schools with low performances.'0 2
Similar to the MPCP, the participating schools and students in the Ohio
system must meet a number of standards.0 3 A private school must register with
the superintendent of public instruction and comply with the statutory terms to be
accepted into the program. '04 Moreover, the only students eligible for aid are
those from low-income families who would otherwise have no opportunity to
choose a different school.0 5
99. Id. § 3313.975(A) (defining a failing school as those "that are or have ever been under federal
court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district by the state
superintendent").
100. Id. (providing money for students who choose to stay in the public schools to be used for
tutoring assistance).
101. Id. § 3313.979 ("Each scholarship or grant to be used for payments to a registered private school
or to an approved tutorial assistance provider is payable to the parents of the student entitled to the
scholarship or grant.").
102. Id. § 3313.978(B) ("The state superintendent shall also award in any school year tutorial
assistance grants to a number of students equal to the number of students who receive scholarships
under division (A) of this section.").
103. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-46.
104. The statutory registration requirements state:
(A) No private school may receive scholarship payments from parents pursuant to section
3313.979 of the Revised Code until the chief administrator of the private school registers the
school with the superintendent of public instruction. The state superintendent shall register
any school that meets the following requirements:
(1) The school is located within the boundaries of the pilot project school district;
(2) The school indicates in writing its commitment to follow all requirements for a
state-sponsored scholarship program specified under sections 3313.974 to 3313.979 of
the Revised Code, including, but not limited to, the requirements for admitting
students pursuant to section 3313.977 of the Revised Code;
(3) The school meets all state minimum standards for chartered nonpublic schools in
effect on July 1, 1992, except that the state superintendent at the superintendent's
discretion may register nonchartered nonpublic schools meeting the other requirements
of this division;
(4) The school does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic
background;
(5) The school enrolls a minimum of ten students per class or a sum of at least twenty-
five students in all the classes offered;
(6) The school does not advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any
person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion;
(7) The school does not provide false or misleading information about the school to
parents, students, or the general public;
(8) The school agrees not to charge any tuition to low-income families participating in
the scholarship program in excess of ten per cent of the scholarship amount....
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A).
105. Id. § 3313.974(D) (defining a low-income family as "a family whose income is below the level
which the superintendent of public instruction shall establish"); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646 ("Families
with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to receive 90% of
10
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An overwhelming majority of the students participating in the Ohio program
attend religious private schools.' 6 This is largely attributed to the abundance of
religious private schools as compared to nonsectarian private schools.'17 Although
there is a financial incentive for neighboring school districts to participate, none
had done so by the time Zelman was decided.0 9 One of the primary criticisms of
this program is that parents may be coerced into sending their children to religious
schools because of the small number of non-religious schools in Cleveland.' 0
Consequently, the Ohio program has been the subject of litigation since its
implementation in 1995.1 Soon after the program's enactment, a group of Ohio
taxpayers challenged it on both state and federal constitutional grounds.! 2 In that
action, the Ohio Supreme Court found the program in violation of the state
constitution's uniformity clause and declined to rule on the federal question."
3
The legislature immediately corrected the deficiency by making the program
universally available to students in Ohio schools, rather than limiting it to the
students in Cleveland's schools."1
4
With the uniformity clause problem amended, the program was once again
challenged on claims that it violated the federal Establishment Clause."5 While
reviewing the case for summary judgment, the district court held that the
program's permissibility rested on the existence of significant options between
sectarian and non-sectarian private schools. 16 Relying on the figures showing that
the vast majority of private schools were religious schools, the district court found
the program unconstitutional because of insufficient choice. 7 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment order of the district court. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.18 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
private school tuition up to $2,250.... [P]articipating private schools may not charge a parental co-
payment greater than $250.").
106. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647 (noting that in the 1999-2000 school year, there were more than 3,700
student participants, ninety-six percent of whom attended religious private schools).
107. Id. (noting that forty-six out of the fifty-six private schools in the program are religiously
affiliated).
108. Id. (observing that adjacent school districts are eligible to receive two to three times more
funding per student than their private school counterparts).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 706-07 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
111. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (reversing the appeals court decision and finding that the program was
non-violative of the U.S. Constitution); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000)
(affirming the decision of the district court that the program was in violation of the U.S. Constitution);
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (holding that the program was not in violation of
the U.S. Constitution but procedurally it violated the Ohio Constitution); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,
72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (issued summary judgment finding violation of the establishment
clause).
112. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203.
113. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648; see Ohio Const. art. II, § 26 (stating that "all laws, of a general nature,
shall have a uniform operation throughout the State . .
114. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648.
115. Id. at 644.
116. Simmons-Harris, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 864-65.
117. Id.
118. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
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the landmark opinion for the Court, declaring the program constitutional." 9 As a
result, the program remains in operation today.
E. Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program
Much like other public education systems across the country, Florida public
schools have a detailed history of struggles.' 2° In fact, Florida's public schools'
rankings are normally in the bottom ten of the states in many subject areas.2 1 In
1999, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Opportunity Scholarship
Program (OSP), 122 an educational voucher program, to help combat the education
problem throughout the state.12' The legislature's intent was "to provide
enhanced opportunity for students in [Florida] to gain the knowledge and skills
necessary for postsecondary education, a technical education, or the world of
work.', 124 In form and operation, Florida's program is similar to those in Ohio and
Wisconsin, with two exceptions: the OSP is available statewide, and it is available
to all students without reference to family income. 25
Under Florida's OSP, participating schools are required to meet a standard
before their students become eligible for the program. 126 For students to become
entitled to benefits, the public school to which they would be assigned must show
repeated failures in academic evaluations. 127 Once the school fails for the requisite
number of years, private schools, both "sectarian and non-sectarian," are allowed
to participate in the program. 128 Money is then distributed to parents to pay the
119. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63. For a discussion of the Zelman decision, see infra § III(C).
120. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 86.
121. Id.
122. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.38 (2003).
123. Id. § 1002.38(1).
124. Id.
125. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 86.
126. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.38(2).
127. See id. § 1002.38(2)(a) (Any school district receiving a grade of "F" in two of four school years
shall have the OSP available to the students attending that district's schools).
128. Private schools must meet the following eligibility requirements:
(a) Demonstrate fiscal soundness by being in operation for 1 school year or provide the
Department of Education with a statement by a certified public accountant confirming that
the private school desiring to participate is insured and the owner or owners have sufficient
capital or credit to operate the school for the upcoming year serving the number of students
anticipated with expected revenues from tuition and other sources that may be reasonably
expected. In lieu of such a statement, a surety bond or letter of credit for the amount equal
to the opportunity scholarship funds for any quarter may be filed with the department.
(b) Notify the Department of Education and the school district in whose service area the
school is located of its intent to participate in the program under this section by May 1 of the
school year preceding the school year in which it intends to participate. The notice shall
specify the grade levels and services that the private school has available for the Opportunity
Scholarship Program.
(c) Comply with the antidiscrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. s. 2000d.
(d) Meet state and local health and safety laws and codes.
(e) Accept scholarship students on an entirely random and religious-neutral basis without
regard to the student's past academic history; however, the private school may give
12
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tuition costs at a private school of their choice. 129  The OSP method of
disbursement is identical to that of Ohio and Wisconsin. 3 °
Opponents of educational choice for children promptly challenged this law
under the federal and state constitutions. 3 ' Deciding this case just over one
month after the Supreme Court's ruling in Zelman, the circuit court declared the
program unconstitutional, explaining that the relevant language of the Florida
Constitution is stricter than the corresponding language of the U.S.
Constitution.'32 Florida Governor Jeb Bush appealed this decision to the state
appeals court.
133
III. VOUCHERS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
School voucher opponents often look to the Establishment Clause of the
U.S. Constitution in efforts to defeat the programs.134 In the past, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made many rulings and proposed many different tests
concerning the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, but debate concerning
the clause's proper interpretation continues.1 36 Some argue that absolutely no
preference in accepting applications to siblings of students who have already been accepted
on a random and religious-neutral basis.
(f) Be subject to the instruction, curriculum, and attendance criteria adopted by an
appropriate nonpublic school accrediting body and be academically accountable to the
parent for meeting the educational needs of the student. The private school must furnish a
school profile which includes student performance.
(g) Employ or contract with teachers who hold a baccalaureate or higher degree, or have at
least 3 years of teaching experience in public or private schools, or have special skills,
knowledge, or expertise that qualifies them to provide instruction in subjects taught.
(h) Comply with all state statutes relating to private schools.
(i) Accept as full tuition and fees the amount provided by the state for each student.
(j) Agree not to compel any student attending the private school on an opportunity
scholarship to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship.
(k) Adhere to the tenets of its published disciplinary procedures prior to the expulsion of
any opportunity scholarship student.
Id. § 1002.38(4).
129. Id. § 1002.38(6)(g).
130. See supra § II(C)-(D) (discussing the Ohio and Wisconsin voucher programs).
131. Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079 at *1.
132. Jim Saunders, Judge Strikes Vouchers Plan: Program Ruled Unconstitutional, Fla. Times-Union
Al (Aug. 6, 2002) (available in 2002 WL 5968777). The state constitution contains the following
language:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing
the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
Fla. Const. art. I, § 3.
133. However, the Florida Supreme Court is expected to deliver the final decision. Saunders, supra
n. 132.
134. U.S. Const. amend. I.
135. See Elisha Winkler, Student Author, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), 10
Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Policy & L. 757, 758 (2002).
136. Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1081.
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public money should flow to religious interests, while others contend that it is
permissible so long as the money does not favor religion. 13 7 The Court's stance
falls between these competing arguments, realizing that "mandating total
separation of church and state is unrealistic and undesirable. 1 38
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman
The most cited precedent for Establishment Clause jurisprudence is found in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.1 9  In that case, the Court sought to "draw lines with
reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."" 140 In articulating its decision,
the Court outlined what has become known as the "Lemon Test."14' To avoid
running afoul of the Establishment Clause, a statute or program must satisfy a
three-pronged test: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.... finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement
with religion.' ' 142 If any one of the prongs is not satisfied, the statute is found
unconstitutional.1
43
Throughout the relatively brief history of this test, rules and patterns have
arisen to address the different prongs. 44 First, the prong requiring a secular
legislative purpose is rarely ever found to be an issue.145 This is especially true in
school funding cases, where the statute's motivation is to improve education-not
to suppress or support religion.46 The second prong of the test is generally
considered the most important and most difficult element of the test. 47 It "seeks
to ensure governmental programs remain neutral with respect to religion' ' 148 by
looking for "an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting'
religion.' ' 149  The third prong of the Lemon Test, outlawing "an excessive
entanglement with religion,"'50 was later re-characterized as an element of the
second prong in Agostini v. Felton.'5
137. Id.
138. Bodemer, supra n. 12, at 293 (footnote omitted).
139. 403 U.S. 602, 615-20 (1971) (holding that state-sponsored salary supplements to teachers at
religious schools who instructed the students in non-religious subjects were unconstitutional because
the supplements represented an excessive entanglement with religion).
140. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
141. Id. at 612-13.
142. Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
143. Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1082.
144. See id. at 1083-84.
145. Id. at 1083.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1084.
148. Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1083-84.
149. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (footnote omitted).
150. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
151. 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) ("[I]n Lemon itself, the entanglement that the Court found
'independently' to necessitate the program's invalidation also was found to have the effect of inhibiting
[Vol. 39:207
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B. Agostini v. Felton
In 1997, the Supreme Court modified the Lemon Test to help evaluate state
money that was reaching private religious schools. 5 2 In addition to incorporating
the third prong into the second, the Court added two additional steps to the
analysis. 5 3 First, the action must not allow for any indoctrination occurring in the
schools that "could reasonably be attributed to governmental action.' 1 4  The
Court later explained,
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and
indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality,
upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to
their religion. If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular
recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.
155
The second addition made to the Lemon Test in Agostini was the restriction that
any recipient of aid was not to be referenced by religion.'5'
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
During the summer of 2002, the Supreme Court ruled on the permissibility
of the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program under the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution."' The Court's opinion rested on the modified Lemon Test as
outlined in Agostini 58 The court first determined that no dispute existed between
the parties concerning the secular nature of the legislation. 5 9  Next, the court
turned to the second prong of the test.' 6° The analysis of this prong turned to
precedent set forth in previous cases where aid was provided to religious
schools.' 6' The programs in the cases varied from those providing direct aid162 to
those that involve "true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious
schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private
individuals.' ' 63 The Court noted its rejection of Establishment Clause challenges
religion. Thus, it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it-as we did in
Walz-as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect." (citation omitted)); see Winkler, supra n. 135,
at 759.
152. See Agostini, 521 U.S. 203. This test is often referred to as the "Modified Lemon Test."
Hansen, supra n. 3, at 93.
153. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 93.
154. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Hansen, supra n. 3, at 93.
157. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
158. Id. at 648-49.
159. Id. at 649.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality) (holding that governmental agency loans of educational
materials to private schools does not violate the establishment clause); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208-09
(holding that a program providing remedial instruction to disadvantaged children was not invalid
under the Establishment Clause).
163. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649 (citations omitted).
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to three different cases involving neutral programs that directly provided aid to a
group of people, who through their own choice used it for religious schools.'
64
In Mueller v. Allen, 65 parents of Minnesota schoolchildren received tax
deductions to help offset the costs of private school or other educational expenses.
To be eligible for the deductions, parents were required to spend money on
expenses that were acceptable under the statute.' 66 The decision to spend money
was neither compelled nor suggested by the state; instead, parents who spent the
money did so solely as a result of their own private choice. 167 Those opposed to
the program argued that because an overwhelming majority of beneficiaries sent
their children to religious schools under the program, it was effectively advancing
religion.' 68 The Court rejected this argument: "We would be loath to adopt a rule
grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the
law.' , 69  As a result, the Court found this program to be constitutionally
170permissible.
Next, the Court noted its decision in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind.17 In that case, the Court approved a scholarship program
that aided blind people studying to become pastors.17 Because the students were
freely able to apply the scholarship to any vocational school, the Court found it
173
was a program of pure private choice. Private choice coupled with universal
availability to all blind people "without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,', 7 4 allowed the Court to
conclude that the program was not inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. 75
Finally, the Court looked at Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
17 6
which involved a federal program that allowed sign language interpreters to aid
deaf students in religious schools. 177 In that case, the Court stated, "[G]overnment
programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined
without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated
financial benefit.' ' 7 8  The Court found that all disabled children qualified to
receive benefits, making them the primary beneficiaries, not the religious
164. Id.
165. 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983).
166. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650.
167. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
168. See id. at 401.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 404.
171. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650-51 (citing Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986)).
172. Witters, 474 U.S. at 482.
173. Id. at 488.
174. Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83 n. 35) (internal quotations omitted).
175. Id. at 489.
176. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
177. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651-52 (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3).
17& Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8.
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schools; 7 9 therefore, the program was acceptable under the Establishment
Clause.' 8
Synthesizing the holdings in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court
outlined a standard to be applied in cases involving the constitution and individual
choice:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause. A program that shares these features permits government aid to reach
religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual
recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived
endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual
recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of the
benefits.181
Stemming from this rule, the Court's primary focus in Zelman was the "true
private choice" parents were allowed to make regarding tuition.182 The Court
reasoned that the method in question, by which parents receive the tuition money
from the state and then endorse the check over to the school of their choice, meets
the standard. 183 Applying this rule to its finding of private choice, the Court found
that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program did not violate the Establishment
Clause.184 The Justices comprising the majority reasoned that the program assists
a broad class of individuals without reference to their religion, it permits any
public or private school within the district as well as adjacent public school
districts to participate, and the destination of the scholarship money is directly
controlled by the parents' private choice.185
D. Constitutionally Permissible School Voucher Framework
The landmark decision for the future of school vouchers in Zelman supplied
the framework for constitutionally permissible voucher programs that legislatures
across the country should find easy to emulate. The program must pass scrutiny
under the Modified Lemon Test-namely it must be secular in nature, facially
neutral, and allow for private choice.
186
The secular requirement has never posed a problem for legislatures enacting
programs with borderline Establishment Clause issues.87 Presumably any attempt
at education reform has improvement of the status quo as its motivation, rather
179. See id. at 9-10.
180. Id. at 14.
181. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
182. See id. at 652-53.
183. Id. at 653.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 648-55.
186. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-56.
187. Nasstrom, supra n. 46, at 1083.
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than furthering religious ideals. Therefore, in order to avoid scrutiny, the
legislature must simply ensure that its true inspiration for reform is to enhance the
school systems.
Next, the legislature must ensure that the program is facially neutral with
respect to religion.' 88 This means that the decisions regarding which children may
participate as well as which institutions provide adequate education must be
neutral. To achieve these ends, the legislature must extend the program to a
whole class of people, such as the low-income families in Cleveland 189 and
Milwaukee,' 9° or any student who attends a failing school in Florida.' 9' Standards
for institutional participants may include health and safety standards, non-
discriminatory provisions, minimum hours of classroom instruction, suitable
performance levels, minimum numbers of students allowed to attend, an
application procedure to be completed, evidence of fiscal responsibility,
acceptance policies for the students, educational requirements for the faculty
members, and maximum tuition price levels.' 9' It is important that these standards
do not refer to the schools by religion; instead, the qualifications must be universal
for all participants.
193
Finally, the legislature must ensure that the schools receive the scholarship
money solely as a result of the private choice of parents. 94 The government may
not coerce or influence the parents to choose one school or another; the choice
must be exclusively that of the student and parents. 95 To illustrate that families
were not coerced into choosing religious schools, the Zelman Court noted that
families who chose private schools were required to pay a small portion of the
tuition.196 The Court went on to say that "such features of the program are not
necessary to its constitutionality, [but] they clearly dispel the claim that the
program 'creates... financial incentive[s] for parents to choose a sectarian
school.""197 Moreover, the government should make the tuition checks payable to
the children's parents, not to the individual school districts. If the checks were
made out to the schools it would appear that the state had some level of influence
over the decisions of parents. The Ohio, Wisconsin, and Florida programs all
make checks payable to parents, further dispelling any doubt that the parental
choice was not influenced by the government.1
8
If state legislatures follow the guidelines set forth above in drafting voucher
programs, federal Establishment Clause questions will likely be dismissed.
188. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-55.
189. Id. at 646.
190. Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(a)(1).
191. Fla. Stat. § 1002.38(2)(a).
192. See e.g. id. § 1002.38; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976; Wis. Stat. § 119.23(2)(b)(1).
193. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
194. Id. at 653.
195. See id. at 653-54.
196. Id. at 654.
197. Id. (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10).
198. Fla. Stat. § 1002.38(6)(g); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.979; Wis. Stat. § 119.23(4)(b).
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However, this does not guarantee that all proposed and enacted voucher programs
will automatically pass judicial scrutiny.
IV. STATE RELIGION CLAUSES
Proponents of school voucher programs believed the ruling in Zelman won
the final round against the anti-voucher sentiment.199 But they failed to anticipate
the reach of state constitutional amendments that more strictly prohibit
government spending regarding religious institutions. °  In fact, one such
amendment has already been employed to defeat the OSP at the trial court level
in Florida.2 '
A. The Origin of Blaine Amendments
The state religion clauses, often termed Blaine Amendments, are the direct
result of bigotry and one person's dream to become president of the United
States.20 2 On December 14, 1875, former Speaker of the House James G. Blaine
proposed a constitutional amendment strictly prohibiting any money from being
spent on religious institutions. There was great support for this amendment in
both houses of Congress, but after passing in the House of Representatives, it
narrowly failed to acquire the two-thirds majority needed in the Senate.'
4
Blaine, a Republican, was believed to be the heir apparent to the presidency,
held at the time by Ulysses S. Grant. 0 5  The year before Blaine's proposal,
however, the Democrats took control of the House of Representatives for the first
time since the Civil War.2°6 This shift in control forced Republicans to "re-
energize the Northern Protestants who formed the Republican base., 20 7 Blaine
was no different. 208 Because he was born to a Catholic mother, Protestants had
even greater apprehension about his beliefs.20 9 To offset their fears, Blaine spoke
of his deeply rooted Protestant background, but he did not feel this rhetoric was
enough to assure the Republican base.2'° As a result, he decided to propose an
199. Marvin Olasky, Breaking Through Blaine's Roadblock <http://www.worldmag.com/world/issue/
08-24-02/coverl.asp> (Aug. 24, 2002).
200. Id.
201. See Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079 at *2.
202. Olasky, supra n. 199.
203. Phillip W. DeVous, Bigotry-A Threat to Parental Choice <http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/
comment/article.php?id=99> (Aug. 7, 2002) (noting that the text of the amendment proposed in the
U.S. House read, "No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect: nor shall any money raised or lands so devoted be divided
among religious sects or denominations.").
204. It failed by only four votes in the Senate. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the
First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 657, 672 (1998).





210. Olasky, supra n. 199.
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amendment to the U.S. Constitution that was meant to tap into the anti-Catholic
bigotry that had permeated American politics through much of the century.211
Despite his efforts, Blaine was not the Republican nominee for president in
1876;212 however, he remained very active in GOP politics until his death in
1893.213
B. Enactment of Blaine Amendments by the States
Even though the amendment failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote
in the Senate, versions of the Blaine Amendment found their way into many state
constitutions.214 In fact, thirty-seven states currently have these provisions in their
constitutions. 215 The large number of states that have Blaine language in their
constitutions can largely be attributed to the actions of Congress following the
failed attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution.216 Congress enacted legislation
that required any new state seeking admission into the United States to adopt
provisions in its constitution with Blaine-like language. 21' As a result, state
constitutions typically have language stating that "no money raised by taxation for
the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund,... shall ever be
under the control of a religious sect.
2 18
The language of Blaine-like amendments in state constitutions seems to
clearly preclude any government funds from reaching religious institutions.
However, courts do not always interpret these clauses so strictly.2'9 For example,
the Arizona Supreme Court found that tax credits to people who donated money
for tuition grant programs did not violate the state's constitution. 20  The court
acknowledged in its opinion that "[t]he Blaine Amendment was a clear
211. In fact, it was said that "[a]ll that Mr. Blaine means to do or can do with his amendment is, not
to pass it but to use it in the campaign to catch anti-Catholic votes." Id. (quoting the March 1876 issue
of The Nation) (internal quotations omitted).
212. This is thought to be the result of lingering questions of his Catholic roots and a House
investigation that accused him of using his power to ensure a land grant railroad from which he would
extract profits. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments, James G. Blaine
<http://www.blaineamendments.org/background/JGB.html> (accessed May 21, 2002) (on file with the
Tulsa Law Review).
213. Blaine served as Secretary of State twice and was the Republican nominee for president in 1884,
which he lost to Chester A. Arthur in a close race. Olasky, supra n. 199.
214. Some were enacted immediately after the failed attempt to adopt a federal constitutional
amendment, while others were enacted in the decades following the attempt. Because some of the
states were not admitted into the union before Blaine's proposal and its failure, many of the states that
adopted the language of Blaine's amendment did so as an initial part of the constitution rather than as
a subsequent amendment. See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments, States
<http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html> (accessed Oct. 12, 2003).
215. Id.
216. See Mauro, supra n. 38, at 8.
217. Id.
218. H.R. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, What's Next for School Choice?, 107th Cong. 100 (July 23,
2002) (testimony of Professor Douglas W. Kmiec) (internal quotations omitted).
219. Id. (noting that Wisconsin, Ohio, Arizona, and Illinois have all upheld variants on choice, while
Maine, Vermont, and Florida have used these clauses to prevent school choice programs).
220. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc). The Court found that the tax credit
was not an appropriation of the public's money, rather, a program that decreased the participants' tax
burdens. Id. at 621.
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manifestation of religious bigotry, part of a crusade manufactured by the
contemporary Protestant establishment to counter what was perceived as a
growing 'Catholic menace."' 22' As previously noted, a circuit court in Florida
reached a different decision, finding that the state's school voucher program
violated the state's constitution.222 Other rulings regarding these provisions range
from levels of uncertainty, permissiveness, to the complete bar of any sort of
123spending on religious institutions.
C. Blaine in Oklahoma
Identical to the amendments in the other states, the language in the
Oklahoma Constitution appears much stricter in regard to religious spending than
its federal counterpart, the Establishment Clause.224 The Oklahoma Blaine
Amendment reads:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, 6r support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as
such.
225
Unlike the lax interpretation in Arizona, the Oklahoma provision is thought
to be one of the most restrictive regarding aid to private institutions.226 The
combination of restrictive constitutional language, case law, and attorney getieral
opinions prevents any sort of public spending from reaching religious
221institutions.
Since 1907, the year in which Oklahoma was admitted into the Union, there
have been three cases that interpreted and applied article II, section 5 of the
constitution in connection with state aid to schools.228 The first of these cases,
Oklahoma Railway Company v. St. Joseph's Parochial School,2 9 gave great hope
for spending in favor of religious institutions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
found that a contract entered into by Oklahoma City providing half-price bus
fares to school children of both public and religious schools did not violate the
state constitution.2 0 This decision seemed to allow aid to students of sectarian
schools.
231
221. Id. at 624 (quoting Joseph P. Vitteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational
Opportunity under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 113, 146 (1996)).
222. See Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079 at *1.
223. These classifications are based on state court decisions, wording of the clauses, and attorney
general opinions. See Kemerer, supra n. 35, at 39-40 tbl. 1.
224. See Okla. Const. art. II, § 5.
225. Id.
226. The other states considered very restrictive are Michigan, Florida, Georgia, Montana, and New
York. Kemerer, supra n. 35, at 5.
227. See id. at 40 tbl. 1.
228. Ewing, supra n. 21, at 479.
229. 127 P. 1087 (Okla. 1912).
230. Id. at 1089.
231. See Ewing, supra n. 21, at 479.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished the next two cases from the
holding in Oklahoma Railway.232 In 1941, the court found that a law requiring
public school buses to transport parochial students to and from school was in
violation of the constitution.2 33 The Gurney Court set this case apart by focusing
on the fact that the buses used were provided with public money, whereas
234Oklahoma Railway involved no form of public spending. It was also noted that
the former case was simply interpreting a railway company's contract with the
city.
235
Then, in 1963, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied and upheld its 1941
236decision. Like Oklahoma Railway and Gurney, Antone involved a law that
provided for the transportation of private religious school students. 237 The court
reasoned that "[a]ny such aid or benefit, either directly or indirectly, is expressly
prohibited by [article II, section 5] of the Constitution of Oklahoma. It must be
upheld and enforced by all Courts.
2 38
The conclusion that can be taken from these cases is that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court strictly interprets the constitution and thus clearly prevents any
public money from reaching a religious institution by either direct or indirect
means.239 Flowing from this strict interpretation is the great likelihood that any
attempted voucher program in Oklahoma will fail to pass state constitutional
challenges.
V. FUTURE OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS IN OKLAHOMA
As previously noted, school voucher programs are permissible within the
framework of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the
240Oklahoma legislators have been given the formula to enact a similar program.
Currently, however, a voucher program would not survive scrutiny under
Oklahoma's Blaine Amendment. 241 In order for vouchers to be permissible in
Oklahoma, the constitutional language must be confronted. This confrontation
may be commenced by either a proposal by the state legislature to amend the
Oklahoma Constitution or by a challenge to the permissibility of the Blaine
Amendment in the courts.
232. Id. at 479-80.
233. Gurney v. Ferguson, 122 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Okla. 1941).
234. Id. at 1004.
235. Id.
236. Bd. of Educ. for Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 913-14 (Okla. 1963).
237. Here, the Midwest City school board decided to transport parochial students to the school each
morning and home in the evening. Id. at 912.
238. Id. at 914.
239. Ewing, supra n. 21, at 483.
240. See supra § Ill(D).
241. Cf Antone, 384 P.2d at 14; Gurney, 122 P.2d at 1005.
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The first hurdle for voucher proposals in Oklahoma to overcome is the lack
of support in the state legislature. As pointed out in the Daily Oklahoman shortly
after the Supreme Court decision in Zelman, the "debate over school vouchers has
registered barely a blip on Oklahoma's education or political radar. 242 Of course,
this support must begin with the citizens of the state, ind like all other arenas
dealing with school vouchers, there are both supporters and opponents of the
243programs. Much of the debate is fueled by the work of public interest groups
such as the Oklahoma Christian Coalition, which is in favor of vouchers, and the
Oklahoma State Boards Association, which stands firmly against the programs.2 "
Furthermore, as results from other programs across the country are released,
interest groups will begin flooding the airwaves with messages of success or
failure. If public opinion does evolve toward choice as a solution to educational
problems in the state, the legislators should mirror the program after the
guidelines outlined in Zelman.245
B. Confronting Blaine
Of course, any sort of legislative action to enact vouchers presumes that the
state's Blaine Amendment hurdle has been overcome. This could occur by either
constitutional amendment or the finding of a de facto or de jure violation of the
U.S. Constitution.
1. Constitutional Amendment
The first possible way to overcome the strict Blaine Amendment in the
Oklahoma Constitution is to amend the constitution. Such an amendment may
simply repeal Article II, Section 5 in its entirety, eliminate the term "indirectly"
from the current language, or grant an exemption to religious schools that meet
certain requirements. By amending the constitution, the legislature would be able
to ensure a permissible school voucher program under the Oklahoma
Constitution.
242. Christy Watson, Little Concern Seen on School Voucher Issue, 111 Daily Oklahoman 1A, 1A
(July 14, 2002) (available in 2002 WL 23138225).
243. See Vouchers: Pro and Con, 108 Daily Oklahoman 14 (Jan. 24, 1999) (available in 1999 WL
7697575). One newspaper article illustrates the variance of opinions held by its readers on school
vouchers. Id. For example, one citizen comments:
No tax breaks for private schools. If you want your kid to go to private schools, you should
pay for it! The state provides public education. The majority of children should be
considered ... not just a few! That money should be put into public schools. No school
vouchers!
Id. Conversely, another citizen argues, "With the decline of our public schools ... we're paying for
education, but we're paying for substandard education. I feel with my tax money, I should have the
right to send my child to whatever school I feel is best for her." Id.
244. Ewing, supra n. 21, at 438-39.
245. See supra § III(D).
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Even though amending the constitution provides the most certain outcome
in regards to Blaine, it is not an easy task to accomplish. 246  To commence
amendment proceedings, one of the legislative houses would have to propose the
amendment, which must then receive a majority vote of each of the two houses.247
If approved, the amendment would then be submitted to the people, who must
vote a majority for acceptance. 248  Because of the largely divisive viewpoints
among people on the issue of religious spending, it may prove difficult to obtain a
majority vote in favor of any program.2 49  Consequently, constitutional
amendment, while a certain approach to guaranteeing voucher success, seems like
a less than viable option in Oklahoma.
2. Free Exercise Challenge
The less certain method to overcome the Blaine roadblock is to challenge
either the constitutionality of the amendments as a whole or their effect under the
U.S. Constitution. This challenge could be brought on the grounds of prohibiting
the free exercise of religion as outlined by the U.S. Constitution. In addition,
250there may be an actionable Equal Protection claim to be pursued.
The Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution appears to be the solution
to overcoming state constitutional hurdles for school voucher programs .21 As
252outlined in Sherbert v. Verner, a law that impedes upon religion must be enacted
for a compelling state interest.213 In Sherbert, the Court noted that "only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.''254 Next, if a compelling state interest has been identified by the Court,
it must be shown that the law uses a method that is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.
255
The Supreme Court has provided the framework to approach a Free
Exercise challenge with respect to Blaine Amendments in some of its earlier
216decisions. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court noted that "the state interest.., in
achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited by the Free Exercise
Clause. ,2.. Justice Thomas, in the plurality decision in Mitchell, wrote that
"hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we
do not hesitate to disavow .... This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried
246. See Okla. Const. art. 24, § 1.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra n. 243.
250. The possible challenge under the Equal Protection Clause will not be examined in this paper
because the Free Exercise Clause will preempt that analysis.
251. U.S. Const. amend. I.
252. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
253. Id. at 406.
254. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)) (internal quotations omitted).
255. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
256. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827-28 (plurality); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
257. 454 U.S. at 276.
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now."25 Mitchell illustrates the contempt four of the Supreme Court Justices have
for the Blaine Amendments and suggests that they will determine the
amendments to be unconstitutional.259  In addition, Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion in Zelman, which was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, mentioned
the anti-Catholic atmosphere surrounding the Blaine Amendments.2 6 As a result,
Kevin Hasson, the executive director of the Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty,
says that "you have seven of the nine justices deploring the history of the Blaine
Amendments [and it is] hard to imagine that if the appropriate case reaches them,
they won't strike them down. 261
When the Court hears the Davey case later this year, or one of the other
cases challenging the Blaine Amendments which are working their way through
the courts, 262 it will likely take one of two available approaches. First, the Court
could find that the amendments themselves violate the Free Exercise Clause, and
thus overturn them. Alternatively, the Court may decide that the amendments are
facially acceptable but have no effect in the voucher setting because they are not a
compelling interest in satisfaction of the Free Exercise Clause. Regardless of the
Court's approach, it seems certain that one of the cases will be the "appropriate
case" to stop Blaine from acting as an impediment to school vouchers.263
a. Overturning Blaine
Blaine Amendments in the states fail on their face to pass the strict scrutiny
required by the Free Exercise Clause. For the amendments to pass judicial
examination, they must, like a statute, be the result of a compelling government
interest.264 As history illustrates, the origin of these amendments stemmed from
bigotry and one man's desire to be president. 265 The states might argue that their
compelling interest was to prevent the entanglement of the government with
religion, but the Federal Establishment Clause already restricts this occurrence. If
furtherance of the principles outlined in the Establishment Clause were the
interest for the states, any furtherance of that doctrine must be within the ambits
258. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29 (plurality).
259. Id.
260. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 719-21 (Breyer, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
261. Mauro, supra n. 38, at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
262. See e.g. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Beckett Fund Challenges South Dakota's Blaine
Amendment <http://www.becketfund.org/press/2003/042403.html> (Apr. 24, 2003) (discussing a
challenge to the Blaine Amendment in South Dakota); Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Litigation:
Boyette v. Galvin <http://www.becketfund.org/litigate/boyette.html> (accessed Oct. 12, 2003)
(discussing a challenge to the Blaine Amendment in Massachusetts); Sheryl James, State Sued by
Student as College Aid Pulled: Theology is Now Major; It Makes Her Ineligible
<http://www.freep.com/news/education/schol6-20030206.htm> (Feb. 6, 2003) (discussing a challenge to
Michigan's refusal to fund scholarships for religious studies in higher education).
263. See Mauro, supra n. 38, at 8.
264. As Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated, "[W]hen we are presented with a state law
granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that
we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
265. Olasky, supra n. 199.
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of the Free Exercise Clause.266  Because there is no genuine compelling state
interest to maintain the amendments, the determination of whether there was
narrow tailoring is unnecessary, and the amendments should be overturned for
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
b. Blaine Not a Compelling Interest
If the Court fails to reject the amendments, it is still likely that a voucher
program will be allowed in the states with Blaine Amendments. In the voucher
setting, if a state provides vouchers only to students who attend public or non-
religious private schools, the state will likely assert that this discrimination is
meant to satisfy both the Establishment Clause and the Blaine Amendment in the
267state. The Supreme Court has already ruled that if a voucher program is
properly created and run, the Establishment Clause does not serve as a bar to
prevent its continued operation. 268 Therefore, the only viable argument for the
discrimination against religious schools is the compelling interest of satisfying the
state's Blaine Amendment.
In the summer of 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a case
which appears to have dispelled the hopes that the Blaine Amendment will serve
as a compelling interest for states to allow exclusion of religious schools from
269voucher programs. In August 1999, Joshua Davey was selected as a recipient of
the Washington Promise Scholarship,27 ° which helped offset the costs of his first
year of postsecondary education. 27' By law, recipients of the scholarship are not
allowed to major in theology. 272  In addition to the Washington Blaine
Amendment, the state maintains an additional law prohibiting funding "to any
student who is pursuing a degree in theology, 273 which extends this theological
266. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
267. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 758.
268. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63.
269. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 760.
270. Eligibility for the program is limited to those people who:
(a) [Graduate] from a public or private high school located in the state of Washington; and
(b) [Are] in the top fifteen percent of his or her 2000 graduating class; or
(c) Attained a cumulative score of 1200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I
(SATI) on the first attempt; or
(d) Attained a cumulative score of 27 or better on the American College Test (ACT) on the
first attempt; and
(e) [Have] a family income less than one hundred thirty-five percent of the state's median;
and
(f) [Enroll] at least half time in an eligible postsecondary institution in the state of
Washington; and
(g) [Are] not pursuing a degree in theology.
Wash. Admin. Code 250-80-020(12) (2003).
271. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750-51.
272. Wash. Admin. Code 250-80-020(12)(f).
273. Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.10.814 (2002).
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barrier to other forms of state scholarships. In compliance with the law, the
Washington Higher Education Board withdrew Davey's scholarship when he
declared a double major in Pastoral Studies and Business Management and
274Administration. Davey sued the executive director of the educational board,
the chair of the educational board, the associate director of the educational board,
and the governor for violating his Free Exercise Clause privileges.275
The defendants in this case claimed that avoiding the violation of its own
276 277state constitution was a compelling reason to deny the scholarship to Davey.
The court of appeals rejected this contention, finding that the exclusion of people
278based on their religious studies is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In
reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged the words of the U.S. Supreme
Court, stating, "[G]uarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits
to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad
and diverse. 279
c. The Free Exercise Challenge
Because of the sweeping reforms that would occur and the strong public
opinion surrounding religion throughout the country, an outright repeal of the
Blaine Amendments in state constitutions seems unlikely, at first. However, if the
Supreme Court hears a string of Blaine Amendment challenges, it is quite possible
that it will chip away at the effect of the amendments until they are in effect
repealed. Davey presents the first opportunity for the Court to whittle away the
effects of the amendments. When the Supreme Court hears the case, forces on
both sides of the church and school debate will do their best to ensure that the
Court applies either the Free Exercise Clause guidelines or overlooks them.
People opposed to the free exercise argument will argue that the Blaine
Amendments block spending on religious institutions, and they will further argue
that the strict scrutiny requirement does not apply. As the Court pointed out in
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,2s° "[A] legislature's decision
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and
274. Davey, 299 F.3d at 751.
275. Id.
276. Washington's Blaine Amendment is found in a combination of three sections of their
constitution. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments, States, Washington <http://www.
blaineamendments.org/states/states filesWA.html> (accessed Oct. 12, 2003) (citing Wash. Const. art.
IX, § 4 ("All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free
from sectarian control."); Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment..."); Wash. Const. art. XXVI, § 4 ("Provision shall be made for the
establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools free from sectarian control, which shall be
opened to all the children of said state.")).
277. Davey, 299 F.3d at 758.
278. Id. at 760.
279. Id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford C Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001)) (internal quotations
omitted).
280. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.' '281  The opposition will contend that the
decision not to provide scholarships for theology students, or alternatively
scholarships for religious private schools, is simply the government refusing to
fund a guaranteed right. Because of this, strict scrutiny need not apply in the case,
which would allow the amendment to remain in force.
On the other hand, advocates of school vouchers will argue that strict
scrutiny must indeed be met. Their reasoning will align with that set forth by the
Ninth Circuit. In advancement of this argument, they will analogize the program
to Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, where the
Court noted that a program expending funds to promote a diversity of views from
private speakers is bound by the precepts of the Free Exercise Clause.283 Both the
scholarship program in Washington and a school voucher program will likely meet
this requirement. And with the apparent discrimination inherent in prohibiting
aid to sectarian institutions, they would surely fail to pass constitutional
examination.
Following the arguments both for and against the Blaine Amendments
prohibiting voucher programs, the Court will likely find the Blaine Amendments
ineffective in a voucher setting to prevent aid to religious schools. While the Court
could take the opportunity to completely dispel the amendments, it is more likely
that they will simply be found not to serve the compelling interest required to
infringe upon one's religious beliefs.
VI. CONCLUSION
School voucher programs stand as a very controversial subject when
discussing the improvement of public schools across the nation. The Supreme
Court, in its landmark decision in 2002, found that such programs are
constitutional. This was the case even though public money was ending up in
religious private schools. Litigation over the merits of the programs under state
constitutions is currently standing as the next bar to vouchers. In Oklahoma,
vouchers will certainly be found impermissible under Article II Section V of the
constitution. However, with the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
and the subsequent grant of certiorari coupled with the current makeup of the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution will likely
soon defeat the state Blaine Amendments, grown out of bigotry in the late
nineteenth century. Once there is a definitive ruling on the Blaine Amendments,
281. Id. at 549 (finding that Congress' decision not to provide public money for lobbying purposes
was not a restriction on their free speech rights).
282. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
283. Id. at 834 (finding a University policy to make payments for printing costs of student groups
could not prohibit a Christian organization from receiving the funds).
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the future of voucher programs, and better educational opportunities for all
children in Oklahoma and across the nation, will turn to state legislators and
public opinion.
Michael J. Dailey*
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